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Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 






   
 
O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Appellants SB Building GP, L.L.C., United States Land Resources, L.P., United 
States Realty Resources, Inc., and Lawrence S. Berger (collectively, “Non-Debtor 
Defendants”) appeal from the District Court’s Opinion and Order entered May 9, 2014, 
which granted the Government’s motion to enforce a consent decree and denied Non-
Debtor Defendants’ motion to modify the consent decree.  Non-Debtor Defendants raise 
two related issues on appeal: (1) whether the District Court erred in refusing to modify 
the consent decree pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
(2) whether the District Court erred in refusing to modify the consent decree pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  We will affirm. 
I.  Background 
Section 104 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9604, empowers the Government to 
access facilities containing hazardous substances and allows the Government to 
commence a civil action if an entity refuses to grant access to such a facility.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9604(e).  Here, the Government was denied permission to access and take over the 
environmental cleanup of the Michelin Powerhouse Superfund Site in Milltown, New 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Jersey (the “Site”).  The owners of the Site are Alsol Corporation and SB Building 
Associates, Limited Partnership (collectively, “Debtor Defendants”).  The Government 
filed suit, and, on July 26, 2011, the District Court entered a consent decree.  The consent 
decree resolved the Government’s civil claims against both Debtor Defendants and Non-
Debtor Defendants and granted the Government continued access to the Site.  Both 
Debtor Defendants and Non-Debtor Defendants subsequently failed to pay the required 
installments under the consent decree, which has triggered additional penalties.  The 
Debtor Defendants have filed for bankruptcy and are not party to this appeal.  On March 
7, 2014, the Government moved to enforce the consent decree and the Non-Debtor 
Defendants later cross-moved to modify the consent decree.  The District Court granted 
the Government’s motion and the Non-Debtor Defendants have appealed. 
II.  Analysis 
 We review a District Court’s decision refusing to modify a consent decree for 
abuse of discretion.  See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 
192, 201 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) 
 Non-Debtor Defendants first urge that the District Court erred by not modifying 
the consent decree pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Rule 60(b)(5) permits a court to modify a consent decree if “applying it prospectively is 
no longer equitable.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).  We have held that “[t]he definitional 
limitation in subsection (5) is significant in that it empowers a court to modify a 
judgment only if it is ‘prospective,’ or executory.”  Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 575 F.2d 
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417, 425 (3d Cir. 1978).  Although the Non-Debtor Defendants have not yet paid the 
damages owed and although the damages continue to accrue, we have “explicitly noted 
that even if the judgment had not yet been satisfied, it would not qualify as prospective 
under Rule 60(b)(5) because ‘[a] ‘prospective’ injunction envisions a restraint of future 
conduct, not an order to remedy past wrongs when the compensation payment is withheld 
from the beneficiaries until some subsequent date.’” Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 
F.3d 262, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Marshall, 575 F.2d at 425 n.27).  The Non-Debtor 
Defendants are seeking relief from payments that are due or scheduled to become due, 
and, therefore, do not meet this prospectivity requirement. Accordingly, Rule 60(b)(5) is 
inapplicable here. 
 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) 
 Non-Debtor Defendants also urge that the District Court erred in not modifying 
the consent decree pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to modify a consent decree for “any other reason that 
justifies relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  “A party seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief must 
demonstrate the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that justify reopening the 
judgment.”  Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (footnote 
omitted).  Extraordinary circumstances are present when a party “demonstrates that 
‘extreme’ and ‘unexpected’ hardship will result absent such relief.”  Jackson v. Danberg, 
656 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2011).  “Extraordinary circumstances rarely exist when a 
party seeks relief from a judgment that resulted from the party’s deliberate choices.”  
Budget Blinds, 536 F.3d at 255.  
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 Non-Debtor Defendants urge that the “extraordinary inflation” of their debt under 
the consent decree is “inequitable” and that they are unable to pay that amount.1  (Apps.’ 
Br. 20.)  As the District Court correctly points out, “the Non-Debtor Defendants freely 
agreed to the terms of the Consent Decree, including the accelerated payment and 
stipulated penalty provisions.”  (App. 9.)  Moreover, the increase from $200,000 to 
$896,751.79 in the amount owed by the Non-Debtor Defendants is not extraordinary.  It 
is not unheard of for courts to uphold stipulated penalties that greatly exceed the amount 
originally due under a consent decree.  See, e.g., United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 
F.3d 598, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding judgment for $4,018,500 in stipulated 
penalties where the original penalty was only $23,000).  Given the Non-Debtor 
Defendants’ deliberate choice to enter into the consent decree, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the Non-Debtor Defendants’ motion to modify the consent 
decree. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
                                              
1 Non-Debtor Defendants also contend that the Debtor Defendants’ bankruptcy was an 
unforeseen changed circumstance, but, as the District Court correctly noted, “the Non-
Debtor Defendants have offered no evidence suggesting that the Debtor Defendants’ 
finances prevent them, the Non-Debtor Defendants, from paying what they currently owe 
under the Consent Decree.”  (App. 6.) 
